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The Anti-Boycott Provisions of the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977
by David Modi*
The oil money available to many Arab states has made them one of
the fastest growing export markets in the world.1 As trade with the
industrialized West has increased dramatically since 1974,2 so has
competition among Western companies for shares of the Arab market.
As a result, the Arab nations have been able to exact compliance by
foreign firms with their boycott to a hitherto unprecedented degree. 3
Initial efforts by the United States to combat the boycott were sporadic
and ineffective. 4 In June, 1977, however, President Carter signed into
law amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969. s Title II of
the amendments makes it illegal for Americans to comply with most
aspects of the Arab boycott.
Following a discussion of the history and content of the boycott,
and of the United States government's earlier responses to it, this note
will examine Title II and its potential effects on American trade with
the boycotting Arab nations.
The Arab Boycott
In 1946, two years before the state of Israel was officially created,
the Arab League began a boycott of Jewish products. 6 In 1951, the
League moved to expand and consolidate the boycott, establishing a
Central Boycott Office in Damascus to coordij te activities among its
various members. The Central Boycott Office iL comprised of a manag-
ing committee consisting of representatives from each member state.
This committee adopts resolutions at regularly scheduled meetings
*A.B. 1976, University of Iowa; J.D. expected 1979, University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1123 CONG. REC. H3276 (daily ed. April 20, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Wirth); Steiner,
International Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Con-
flict, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1355 (1976).2Steiner, supra note 1. See generally, Hearings on Discriminatory Arab Pressure on
U.S. Business Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bingham
Hearings]; 123 CONG. REC. H3272 (daily ed. April 20, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Pascell).3Guzzardi, That Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontier, FORTUNE, July 1975, at 82. The
Commerce Department reported that Arab oil income in 1975 was three to four times
what it was in 1973 and that the Arabs are using this money for massive economic
development.4See text accompanying notes 20-36 infra.
5Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2413).
6Arab League Council, resolution No. 16, Dec. 16, 1945, cited in LOWENFELD,
TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 99 (1975). L. PRESTON, TRADE PATTERNS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 51 (1970).
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and maintains a central blacklist. The blacklist is a list of names of all
foreign firms which are forbidden by the boycott practices from having
commercial intercourse with Arab nations. 7
Despite the central and apparently highly coordinated organiza-
tion, actual administration of the boycott is not centralized. The Cent-
ral Boycott Office's resolutions are not binding on member states, and
each country is free to add to, or subtract from, the central blacklist to
meet its own peculiar needs. For this reason, enforcement of the
boycott varies from country to country. 8
Because the Arab states are in the position of trying to encourage
foreign trade and investment while at the same time trying to enforce a
boycott which restricts such trade and investment, foreign companies
are often arbitrarily and even capriciously blacklisted and then de-
listed. Blacklist inclusions range from concerns such as Hartz Moun-
tain Pet Food Co., to Xerox, Coca-Cola and Ford Motor Co. 9 Some are
not blacklisted at all even though they may trade quite extensively with
Israel. General Electric, for example, sells military engines to both
Israel and the Arabs. 10 Having top-notch military equipment is appa-
rently more important than boycotts to the Arabs, and they therefore
are willing to wink at boycott violations, however flagrant, if it is in
their interest to do so. 11
Anatomy of the Boycott
There are three distinct aspects of the Arab boycott against Israel:
primary, secondary and tertiary.
The primary boycott is the Arabs' refusal to trade directly with
Israel. It includes a refusal to import goods that contain Israeli compo-
nents. 12
7Guzzardi, supra note 3, at 84.
81d. Stern, On and Off the Arabs' List, NEw REPUBLIC, March 27, 1976. See also
Hearings on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, (94th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11 (1975) ) [hereinafter cited as Church Hearings]; See also generally,
Bingham Hearings, supra note 2.
9 Stern, supra note 8, at 9.
'Old.
"See generally Bingham Hearings, supra note 2, at 24-38. "This is an area where you
can blink, where you can wink and where you can cheat..."
Getting off the blacklist is difficult for a firm. Xerox, which was blacklisted for
making a documentary film about Israel, was apparently told that an investment in an
Arab nation - the sum comparable to that which it spent on the film - would suffice
to get its name off the list. Another company was approached by a Syrian lawyer who
told the company how it could get off. The company was willing, but it later learned
that the lawyer was publicly hanged in Damascus. Stern, supra note 8.
12One commentator divided the primary boycott as defined here into two parts -
a core primary boycott and an extended primary boycott. The extended primary
boycott according to his definition is the Arab refusal to import goods containing
Israeli components. Steiner, supra note 1, at 1367-68.
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The secondary boycott is the Arabs' refusal to deal with third-
country individuals or companies that maintain commercial relations
with Israel. It is designed to intensify the pressure on Israel by isolating
it from trading partners, and by forcing foreign firms to choose bet-
ween trade with the Arabs or trade with Israel. 13 The secondary
boycott is also an attempt to engender hostile feelings toward Israel in
the foreign firm's home country.
The tertiary boycott 14 is the Arabs' refusal to buy goods from a
foreign firm whose products contain components of blacklisted com-
panies or whose services include those of blacklisted sub-contractors.
Thus, if firm A is blacklisted, and firm B manufactures a product which
contains components manufactured by A, the Arabs will refuse to buy
that product from firm B. Firm B itself, though, will not be blacklisted.
B therefore, will choose non-blacklisted components when filling or-
ders from Arab nations. Thus, the tertiary boycott is far more disrup-
tive of American commerce than is the secondary boycott. It becomes
involved directly in molding commercial relations among American
companies operating in the United States. For this reason, a company
which now complies with the tertiary boycott runs the risk of violating
not only Title II, but also the Sherman Antitrust Act.15
Another aspect of the boycott, subtle but present nonetheless, is
that of religious discrimination. Though the Arabs strive mightily to
allay fears that the boycott is based on a person's religion,1 6 religious
discrimination is a part of the boycott.' 7
Enforcement of the Boycott
The Arab countries attempt to compel and .rify compliance with
the boycott by requiring an affidavit, a questionnaire, a certificate of
origin or a letter-of-credit certification, depending on the business of
13A company will not always be placed on the blacklist for violating boycott rules.
See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
14Steiner called this the extended secondary boycott. Steiner, supra note 1, at
1369.
15The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal."
16Letter from Abdul Aziz H. al Sazar to the United States Department of Com-
merce (undated), General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture
for Arab Countries, The Arab Boycott of Israel: Its Grounds and Regulations, re-
printed in Hearings on Contempt Proceedings against Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C. B.
Morton, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 146. (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Moss Hearings].
"See Stern, supra note 8, at 8; Hearings on S. 425, Amendment No. 24 Thereto; S.
953, S. 995, & S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Stevenson Hearings].
Mohammed Mahgoub, the Central Office's Commissioner General, once said
that "[t]he blacklist includes companies when it is proven by definite evidence that
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the foreign firm. 18 Failure to fill out and return the form within a
certain time is ground for blacklisting. 19 These forms inquire into the
foreign firm's trade relationships with Israel and with blacklisted firms.
Initial American Responses
The first official United States governmental response to the
boycott was in 1965. Amendments to the Export Control Act of 194920
were introduced making it unlawful for Americans to comply with the
Arab boycott. The Johnson Administration opposed these amend-
ments. 21 A compromise was struck, and the language was eventually
they, their proprietors or controllers have Zionist tendencies." Guzzardi, supra note 3,
at 168. What constitutes such "definite evidence" is unilaterally decided by the
Boycott Office, since a firm under consideration for blacklisting receives no notifica-
tion thereof and therefore has no opportunity to be heard. The phrase "Zionist
inclination" is a catch-all which is used to discriminate against Jewish people.
In one instance, the Saudi Arabian government exacted compliance by the
United States Corps of Engineers with religious discrimination. Congress, not unex-
pectedly, was inflamed by this report. Church Hearings, supra note 8, at 201-04.
There are conflicting reports as to how many specific cases of religious discrimi-
nation based on the boycott have occurred. Compare, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the
Arab Boycott and American Business 33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Arab Boycott and
American Business]; Stevenson Hearings, supra note 14, at 178; Bingham Hearings, supra
note 2, at 84; and Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory,
Middle East Politics and United States v. Bechtel Corporation, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1411, 1430,
n.100 (1976).
"Letter from Abdul Aziz H. al Sazar to the United States Department of Com-
merce, Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at 146. See also Bingham Hearings, supra note 2, at
15.
The Arabs claim that the boycott does not apply to "normal dealings" with
Israel but-only to those trading relationships which enhance the military or economic
power of Israel. Specifically, activities proscribed by boycott rules include:
For manufacturing and trading companies: having main or branch offices in
Israel, having assembly plants in Israel, assembling goods in Israel for shipment to
Arab countries, maintaining general or main offices in Israel, granting manufacturing
licenses to Israeli companies, rendering consultative or technical services to Israeli
factories, holding shares in Israeli companies, allowing their directors to become
members of joint foreign-Israeli Chambers of Commerce, acting either as agents for
Israeli companies or as principal importers of Israeli products outside of Israel, and
prospecting for natural resources in Israel;
For banks: granting loans or subsidies to Israeli firms which carry out "major"
military, industrial or agricultural projects, distributing or promoting Israeli loan
bonds, establishing companies in Israel, and helping Israeli companies raise capital.
The rules also contain forbidden activity for navigation companies, motion
picture companies, insurance companies and shipbuilding companies. Moss Hearings,
supra note 6, at 146-49.
"Moss Hearings, supra note 6, at 146.
20Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7.
2tHearings to Amend Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-18 (1965) (testimony
of George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State). Ball feared that anti-boycott legislation
"would interfere seriously with the effective operation of programs of economic
denial that we are now conducting against several Communist countries..." Much of
the information the United States called upon foreign firms to furnish in order to
facilitate American enforcement of its boycotts was the same information United
States firms were prohibited by the proposed amendments from furnishing.
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incorporated into the Export Administration Act of 1969. The American
response was limited to a policy statement that it is contrary to United
States public policy to comply with boycotts instituted against coun-
tries friendly to the United States. 22 The 1969 Act also required Ameri-
can companies receiving boycott requests to report to the Secretary of
Commerce that they received such requests, but they were not re-
quired to report whether they complied or intended to comply with the
request. 23 The Act gave the Secretary of Commerce the power " to
exercise such controls... as ... are necessary to facilitate and effec-
tuate... the policy set forth in this Act." '24
Neither the Nixon nor the Ford administration favored extensive
controls over American business' compliance with the boycott, 2 and
the policy statement of the Export Administration Act was seriously
undermined. 26
22pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, Section 3(5) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2402(5)
(1975) ).
23Id.
2450 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(1) (1975). See note 147 infra.
25See generally Bingham Hearings, supra note 2; Stevenson Hearings, supra note 14;
Hearings on the Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969 Before the House
Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Morgan Hearings].
26No sanctions were imposed by the United States government against any firms
for non-compliance with the Export Administration Act of 1969 until 1975. Since 1975
the activities of 105 firms have been investigated, but only five have actually been
reprimanded, receiving only $1000 fines. The other one hundred were given warn-
ings.
In 1975, Congressional interest in the effects of the boycott increased. A House
Subcommittee subpoenaed from the Secretary of Commerce, Rogers Morton, infor-
mation as to American companies and their compliance with the reporting require-
ments of the 1969 Act. Secretary Morton refused, claiming confidential disclosure
under the Act, and the House Subcommittee instituted contempt proceedings against
him. Moss Hearings, supra note 6.
There is evidence that the Commerce Department indirectly aided the Arabs in
their boycott. The Department had adopted a policy of circulating business offers from
Arab boycotting nations to American companies when such offers contained boycott
requests. Included in the offer package was a statement by the Commerce Department
that American firms were encouraged and requested, but not legally required, to
resist compliance with the boycott requests. Several Congressmen saw the phrase
"but not legally required" as an attempt to deliberately evade the stated public policy
of section 3(5) of the Export Administration Act of 1969. See Moss Hearings, supra note
6, at 38-40.
During the dispute decided in Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidemar, 417 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), Antco employed an ingenious, though unsuccessful, ploy to put
some teeth into section 3(5)'s policy statement. The shipping contract it had with the
defendant contained a provision preventing the ship from docking at Israeli ports.
Later, Antco wished to be relieved of its contractual obligations and argued that the
provision on Israeli ports was a boycott related request, tainting the entire contract. It
concluded therefore that the contract was void and unenforceable as against American
public policy delineated in 3(5) of the Export Administration Act of 1969.
The court held against Antco. It refused to take judicial notice that the provision
excluding Israeli ports as docking ports was a boycott provision, declaring instead that
it could as easily have been a "safe ports" provision, in view of the risk of hostilities in
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Prelude to Title II
In 1975, the United States position changed. By then, the boycott's
influence on American commerce had become very real and far-
reaching. 2 7 Companies were receiving boycott requests in record num-
bers28 and, more often than not, 2 9 were complying with them. Con-
gressional interest in the boycott was aroused. Hearings were held and
bills were introduced. 30
President Ford then began taking executive action. 31 In November
1975, President Ford issued a directive to all executive agencies 32 in
which he attacked the boycott's religious discrimination and ordered
all federal agencies to ignore any exclusionary policies of the host
country when making overseas assignments. 3 3
In December, the Commerce Department revised its Export Ad-
ministration Act regulations prohibiting religious or racial discrimina-
tion by exporters. 34
In January 1976, the Justice Department, over the objections of Henry
Kissinger, instituted anti-trust proceedings against Bechtel Corp., for
the region. The court conveniently neglected to mention, though, why the safe ports
provision did not also exclude Egyptian or Lebanese ports.
27Prior to 1974, most trade between the United States and the Arab nations was a
one-way street - oil going to the United States. This changed in 1974 with the
increase in Arab oil revenue. It is estimated that 1974 OPEC revenue surpluses were
$105 billion, $55 billion of which was available for foreign investment and $50 billion
for the purchase of goods and services. 121 CONG. REC. H6579-81 (daily ed. July 10,
1975) (remarks of Rep. Holtzmann). See also notes 2-3 supra.
281n 1973, 1,152 United States export transactions that were reported involved an
Arab boycott demand. Seven hundred and eighty-five such transactions were re-
ported in 1974. Bingham Hearings, supra note 2, at 12. For the six months ending
September 30, 1976, 72,781 such transactions, involving $5.5 billion, were reported.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT ON EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS OF 1977 TO ACCOMPANY S. 69 (Senate
print 1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 95-104].
29From January 1, 1974 to December 5, 1975, 45% of those companies reporting
boycott requests indicated compliance therewith, 53% did not indicate whether they
complied, and only .119% stated they refused to comply. Morgan Hearings, supra note
25, at 24.
3 0From 1974-1977, over thirty bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress
which were aimed at restricting the boycott's influence on American business.3 1The first came in February 1975, when President Ford ordered all federal
agencies whose activities concerned the boycott to reconsider their boycott practices.
President's News Conference of February 26, 1975, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 218
(March 3, 1975).
3 2 president's Statement on Foreign Boycott Practices, November 20, 1975, 11
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1305 (November 24, 1975).
331d.
3415 C.F.R. 369.1 (1975), as amended by 15 C.F.R. 369.1 (1976). The Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969 had by its own terms expired on September 30, 1976.
President Ford, acting under authority granted him by the Trading With the Enemy
Act of 1917, issued an executive order ordering the Secretary of Commerce to continue
administering the Export Administration Act programs. See 2 N.C.J. INT'L LAW & COM.
REG. 77 (1977).
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alleged discrimination against certain American sub-contractors in
compliance with the tertiary boycott. 3s
The Congressional drive for anti-boycott legislation continued. A
provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 known as the Ribicoff
Amendment denied international tax benefits to those companies
which cooperated with the boycott. 36 More comprehensive bills were
introduced and passed both the House and the Senate. A conference
committee, blocked by Senate manuevering in 1975, was convened and
a bill satisfactory to both bodies emerged in June 1977. The bill was passed
in the Senate on the 7th, and in the House on the 10th. President Carter
signed it into law on June 22, 1977.
Title II
The bill is entitled the Export Administration Amendments of
1977. 3 7 Title 1138 contains the anti-boycott provisions. 39 It is a com-
3 51n the complaint the government alleged that Bechtel engaged in a combination
or conspiracy which resulted in an unreasonable restraint on trade, in violation of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Bechtel answered that (1) the Arab League boycott
of Israel is political in nature and hence beyond the scope of the Sherman Act; (2)
other government agencies sanctioned the very participation in the boycott with
which the defendant is charged and the government is therefore estopped from this
prosecution; and (3) the defendants are not liable because of the sovereign compulsion
and act-of-state doctrines.
The case thus raised some interesting questions about international and domes-
tic law. They were, however, never adjudicated because Bechtel and the government
agreed to an out-of-court settlement, including an injunction which forbade Bechtel
from engaging in the alleged illegal conduct. The injunction will remain in force for
twenty years. Title II will probably not have an appreciable effect on it since,
ostensibly, the activity in which Bechtel engaged is also forbidden by Title II.
The Bechtel case was significant for several reasons. The Bechtel group of
contractors was the largest American group in the Middle East. By tackling the
biggest, especially over then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's misgivings, the
Justice Department was manifesting a tougher attitude toward anti-boycott provi-
sions. One commentator believed, however, that the settlement indicated a lack of
conviction on the part of the government. Lowenfld, supra note 6, at 124.
For a discussion of the Bechtel case, see Note, The Arab Boycott and the Bechtel
Case, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 383 (1977).
For a discussion of the antitrust aspects of the Arab boycott and American
business, see Areeda, Remarks on the Arab Boycott, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1432 (1976); Kesten-
baum, supra note 14; Comment, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 795 (1976); Note, Export Policy, Antitrust and the Arab Boycott, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV.
94 (1976).
36Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-1064 (1976), (to be codified in I.R.C. §§ 908, 952(a),
995(b)(1), 999).3
-
7Pub.L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2413).
38Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977), Title II, §§ 201-205 (to be codified in 50
U.S.C. §§ 2403a-2410). Title II was largely the product of a compromise negotiated
between the Business Roundtable, which generally opposed restrictive legislation,
and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, which generally favored restrictive
legislation. There was fear that a strong law would antagonize business interests, and
a weak one Jewish interests. In many respects Congress, except for a few members,
took a back seat in formulating the language of Title II. The Roundtable and the ADL
desired above all to present to Congress a bill suitable to all and thus to avoid an
emotional debate. The result was a law which sought to strike a balance between
morality and economics, a compromise which satisfied no one. N. Y. Times, Aug. 21,
1977, § 3, at 5, col. 3.
39The law is not limited specifically to curbing compliance with the Arab boycott
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promise between those factions which wanted stricter legislation and
those which wanted no legislation at all. 40 Recognizing that every
nation has the sovereign right to trade with whom it wishes, Congress
sought to avoid language which might interfere with the Arabs' primary
boycott of Israel. Title II, therefore, is technical and has many excep-
tions. It does, however, attempt to outlaw all compliance with the
secondary and tertiary boycotts.
Section 201(a) orders the President to issue "rules and regulations"
making it unlawful for any United States person engaging in
"interstate or foreign commerce" to take any of the prohibited actions
"with intent to comply with.., any boycott... imposed by a foreign
country against a country which is friendly to the United States."
4 1
Intent is an essential element of a violation. If a person does not have
the intent to comply with a boycott request, then his activities will not
be punishable, even though furthering the boycott's goals.
42
According to the proposed Commerce Department regulations is-
sued pursuant to section 201(a), a United States person will be pre-
sumed to have the requisite intent if the existence of the boycott is a
motivating factor in that person's decision to take a particular action. 43
Thus, if an American company explores business opportunities in the
boycotted country and decides for boycott related reasons not to
pursue them, it has violated Title II. If it decides for legitimate business
reasons not to pursue these opportunities, however, no violation will
be found. 44
but applies to boycotts in general. On the other hand, its provisions are aimed at
preventing compliance with whatever forms the Arab boycott takes.40See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. H3277 (daily ed. April 20, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Waxman).41Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201(a) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a). One
possible loophole is found in the use of the word "friendly" to describe nations
against which compliance with a boycott is forbidden. The term "friendly nation" is
not defined in Title II. A company under prosecution for violation of Title II could
argue that Israel, in light of the recent disagreements, is not friendly to the United
States. Though this is perhaps not an effective or even probable argument, Title II
nevertheless offers no clarification of this issue.
42S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 37.
4342 Fed. Reg. 48,561 (1977), (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. 369.1(e)(2) ). Making the
boycott "a" motivating factor apparently encompasses more activity than if the
boycott were "the" motivating factor. An example of this definition of intent is
provided in the regulations. A bank which regularly implements letters-of-credit
containing boycott requests violates Title II even if it did not know of the requests
since it "could have learned of the prohibited condition in any such letter-of-credit."
Id. at 48,562, example (iv). Intent is implied through inactivity or lack of affirmative
action.441d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. 369.1(e), Examples of Intent (vii), (viii) ). Such a
provision is likely to result in firms being hesitant to explore business opportunities in
a boycotted country, lest their refusal to follow through be viewed as a violation of
Title II. It seems naive to think that a company contemplating a major investment in a
boycotted nation will not take into account, at least .to an extent, the possible
repercussions stemming from the boycott, including blacklisting. In such a case, the
existence of the boycott would be a motivating factor in the firm's decision and a
denial to follow up its initial explorations will be a violation. Whether this will be the
effect will depend upon how strictly the section is enforced.
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Even if a legitimate business reason may exist for a-refusal to do
business, if the refusal is also even partially motivated by a boycott
request, Title II has been violated. 45 If an American company has been
blacklisted because it has a plant in a boycotted country, then it will
violate Title II if it closes that plant in an effort to get off the blacklist. 46
Section 4A(a)(1)(A) and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder prohibit refusing to do business for boycott reasons. 47
Refusals to do business include the exclusion of any person or country
from a transaction for boycott reasons, 48 refusals implied by a course or
pattern of conduct, 4 9 refusing to accept a business opportunity for
boycott related reasons,50 maintaining either a blacklist or a whitelist,51
or advising another party not to do business.5 2 This section attempts to
cover both the secondary and tertiary boycotts.
To avoid possible misinterpretation, the second part of the section
adds that the absence of a business relationship in the boycotted
country or with a blacklisted company does not establish a Title II
violation.5 3 That is, a company is under no obligation to affirmatively
seek the business of boycotted countries or companies. A specific
agreement to refuse to do business is not necessary to find a violation;
an action pursuant to a request or other requirement is sufficient.5 4
If an American firm negotiates a contract with a boycotting coun-
try (without a boycott request) and then submits to the country a list of
potential sub-contractors on a non-discriminatory basis, the firm may
comply with the boycotting country's selection of a sub-contractor,
although it may know that the selection was boycott based.55 How-
45Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201(a)4A(a)(1)(A) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1(A) ).
4642 Fed. Reg. 48,563 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a), Examples of
Refusals to do Business; Refusals to Do Business (v) ). This section could directly
interfere with business planning. If a company decides that doing business with the
boycotting countries is more profitable than doing business in the boycotted country,
this section prevents that company from carrying out its decision. There are qualifica-
tions: the company must be blacklisted and it must want to relocate its business
activities "in an effort to have itself removed from boycotting country('s)...
blacklist." Yet this section creates a presumption of a violation anytime a blacklisted
firm wishes to sever its ties with a boycotted nation. More effective enforcement of the
Act could result, but it would interfere with long range business planning.
4742 Fed. Reg. 48,562 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(2) ).
481d.
49Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(6) ).
5 Old.
"lId. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(7) ).
521d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(8) ).
53Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(1)(A) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
54S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 38. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,562 (1977) (to be codified
in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(10) ).
5542 Fed. Reg. 48,563 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. 369.2(a), Examples of
Refusal to do Business; Refusals to Do Business (xi) ).
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ever, in the same situation "except that the [boycotting country] selects
the [sub-contractor] and requests the [general contractor] to advise the
[sub-contractor], arrange for the shipment, and inspect the goods
upon arrival,"'5 6 the American general contractor has violated Title II
because its "post-award actions carry out his client's boycott based
decision. "7
Subsections (B) and (C) prohibit discrimination based on race,
religion, sex or national origin, either through direct employment of an
individual or by furnishing such information about a United States
person. 5s Section 4A(a)(4) of Title II, states that nothing in this law
shall effect in any way the operation of civil rights laws of the United
States. s9
If an American company receives from a boycotting country an
offer containing the requirement that "no persons of country X are to
work. on this project," then entering into this contract will violate Title
11.60 However, if the request asks that "no persons who are citizens of
country X are to work on this project," then entering into the contract
will not violate Title 11.61
If a boycotting country tenders an invitation to bid on a construc-
tion project in its country, and such invitation specifies that "women
will not be allowed to work on this project," an American firm agreeing
to this tender will not violate Title 11.62
An American company may not comply with a request that a
six-pointed star (presumably the Star of David) not be used on the
packaging of the products to be imported into the boycotting country,
on the ground that, inasmuch as the six-pointed star is a religious
symbol, compliance with this request by the American company is
certification that it will not ship products made by persons of that
religion. 63 But the American company may comply with a request not
5 61d. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a), example (xii) ).
571d. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a) ). The distinction the examples make is
based on what the American general contractor does after receiving the boycott
selected sub-contractors.
s8pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(1)(B), (C) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
5 91d., § 201 4A(a)(4) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a). It is arguable that other
civil rights laws outlaw discrimination that is associated with the Arab boycott. See
Comment, The Arab Boycott and Title VII, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181 (1977).
6042 Fed. Reg. 48,564 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b), Examples of
Discriminatory Actions, example (ii) ).6 11d. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b), example (iii) ). The distinction,
according to the regulations, is that in the first the discrimination is on the basis of
"national origin," whereas in the second, it is on the basis of "nationality."
621d. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b), example (vi) ). The rationale given is
that the restriction against employment of women is not boycott-based. This rationale
completely contradicts Title II, which explicitly forbids sex discrimination. Supra note
58. It is interesting to note that this is one of the few instances in which Title II is
interpreted narrowly, rather than broadly.6 31d. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b), example (viii)).
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to use a symbol of a boycotted country on its packaging, such symbol
conveying no statement about persons of any particular religion. 64
Subsection (D), like subsection (A), attempts to eliminate com-
pliance with the secondary and tertiary boycotts by prohibiting United
States persons from furnishing information on whether that person
has, has had, or intends to have business relations in the boycotted
country or with any blacklisted country when such information is
sought as a boycott request.65 Enforcement of this section will have a
greater impact than enforcement of (A) since a firm usually fills out a
questionnaire' or other form indicating that it will refrain from pros-
cribed activities before it actually refrains from carrying out those
activities. 66 Title II makes it illegal to fill out the questionnaire.
Subsection (D) allows the furnishing of "normal business informa-
tion in a commercial context.. "67 Normal business information may
include factors such as financial fitness, technical competence or pro-
fessional experience, and may be found in documents normally availa-
ble to the public. These documents would include annual reports,
disclosure statements, promotional brochures and business and trade
handbooks. 68 For instance, an architect or engineering firm would be
allowed to send information about its professional competence to a
prospective client, even though such information might incidentally
reveal business relations that are forbidden by the boycotting country's
rules. 69 But if the information is sought pursuant to a boycott related
request, compliance with the request is not allowed, irrespective of
whether the information is available to the public and is considered
normal business information. 70 A presumption of illegality arises if it is
"reasonably clear" that the information is sought for boycott purposes.
The "clearest case" is where the questionnaire seeks only information
on the firm's business relations with the boycotted country or with
blacklisted firms. This presumption is subject to rebuttal. 7 1
Subsection (E) forbids furnishing information about one's mem-
bership in, contribution to, or association with, any fraternal or charit-
able organization that supports the boycotted country. 72 The prohibi-
64Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b), example (ix) ). What will happen if a
religious symbol and a nation's symbol are the same is left open.
6SPub. L. No. 95-52, Title I, § 201 4A(a)(1)(D) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
661n that sense, this subsection most of all affects American commerce.
6 7Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(1)(D) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
6842 Fed. Reg. 48,565 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(4) ).
69S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 40.
7042 Fed. Reg. 48,564 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(5) ).
71S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 40.
72Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(1)(E) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
116 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
tion does not apply if the information is incidental to a boycott request,
such as the organizations one might list on a resume.7 3
Subsection (F), applicable to banks, prohibits them from honoring
or implementing letters-of-credit7 4 which contain conditions com-
pliance with which is unlawful under any section of Title I.75 Again
intent is required, and a bank which "accidentally" implements a
letter-of-credit with a boycott request will not run afoul of subsection
(F), so long as it takes steps to guard against future accidents. 76 For this
section to apply, the transaction in question must be within the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States and the intended
beneficiary of the letter must be a United States person. 77
Title II's applicability is limited only to transactions "in the in-
terstate or foreign commerce of the United States."78 All exports from,
and imports to the United States are considered as activities in the
United States commerce. Also included is action by a foreign sub-
sidiary or affiliate of a United States company when so directed by the
American parent.7 9 United States commerce further includes activities
between foreign firms and firms which are controlled in fact80 by
American firms.8 '
A foreign firm's purchase of goods from its American parent is
considered within United States commerce in the following situations:
(1) if the goods were purchased to fill a specific order from a person in
the boycotting country; 82 (2) if the goods were acquired for incorpora-
tion into a product pursuant to a specific order from a boycotting
country;8 3 (3) if the goods are ultimately used to fulfill an order from a
boycotting country, regardless of whether they are to fill a specific
order or whether they were originally intended for that purpose.8 4 But
73S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 40.
74For a description of what letters-of-credit are and how they operate to finance
exports, see Note, Financing Exports: Private Methods and Public Assistance, 2 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 59 (1977).
75Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(1)(F) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. §
2403-1a).
76S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 42.
77Id. at 41. The report contains some perplexing language: "(I)f a bank cannot
determine whether a German company, which may be a subsidiary of a U.S. com-
pany, is a 'U.S. person' for purposes of the bill, or, having resolved that question, is
unable to determine whether the transaction to which the credit relates involved U.S.
commerce, it will have no choice but to reduce the business. Such would be both
unfair and inconsistent with the intended scope and reach of the bill." It is unclear
from this passage what result is unfair and inconsistent.78Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title 1I, § 201 4A(a)(1) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a).
7942 Fed. Reg. 48,560 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(2) ).
80For a definition of "controlled in fact," see text accompanying notes 90-94 infra.
"'Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(3),(4) and (5)).
821d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(5)(ii) ).831d, (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(5)(iii) ).
84Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(5)(v) ). This provision is more com-
prehensive than the others and includes many of them. Perhaps it is here for
emphasis.
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if the purchased material is used in the subsequent manufacture of
another product, not pursuant to a specific order, the transaction is not
within United States commerce. 85
If a foreign owned company operating outside the United States
has a contract to construct a building in a boycotting country, an
American engineering firm's supplying of consulting services to the
foreign company is an activitywithin United States commerce, despite
the foreign firm's freedom from the restraints of Title 11.86
Title II's applicability is further limited to transactions involving
United States persons. 87 A United States person is partially defined as
"any permanent foreign establishment,18 8 described as a foreign con-
cern which is licensed or registered, or is doing business, in any state
in the United States. 89
A United States person is also partially defined as a foreign
subsidiary or affiliate of a domestic concern which is "controlled in
fact" by that domestic concern. 90 A foreign affiliate or subsidiary will
be deemed controlled in fact when any of the following conditions is
met: (1) if more than fifty percent of the outstanding voting securities
of the foreign affiliate are owned by the American domestic company;
(2) if the United States firm controls the foreign firm through an
exclusive management contract; (3) if a majority of the board of
directors of a foreign firm are also members of the comparable govern-
ing body of the American company.91 A presumption of controlled in
fact arises when more than twenty-five percent of the foreign firm's
outstanding voting securities are owned or controlled by the American
parent, or when the American parent has the authority to appoint the
majority of the board of directors of the foreign firm. 92 This presump-
tion is rebuttable by competent evidence. 93
85 d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(7) ). Presumably, therefore, a foreign
subsidiary can import goods from a U.S. person and use them with impunity to
manufacture another. As long as there is no specific order all is legal in the above
transaction. The distinction is between resale of the product whole, and resale of the
product as incorporated into another. It appears to serve no real purpose and will
result in foreign subsidiaries buying foreign. Transactions between foreign sub-
sidiaries and non-U. S. persons never come within U. S. commerce.
8642 Fed. Reg. 48,560 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d), Examples of
Activities in the Interstate or Foreign Commerce of the United States, United States
Person in the United States, example (iv) ). This could cause problems. Suppose, for
example, the foreign firm's construction contract is under a boycott request. Whether
the American company automatically violates Title II by supplying consulting services
- regardless of whether its contract with the foreign firm is boycott free and whether
it knew of the boycott provisions of the master contract - is not answered.
8 Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 204 11(1) and (2) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2410).
8
"Id.
8942 Fed. Reg. 48,559 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b)(iv) ).90Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 204 11(2) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2410).
9142 Fed. Reg. 48,559 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2) ).
921d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(4) ).
931d.
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A foreign incorporated company is deemed controlled in fact by an
American company if it is fifty-one percent or more controlled by
another foreign corporation which itself is fifty-one percent or more
controlled by the American company. 94 This is a broad extension of the
controlled in fact definition.
Title II has many exceptions listing activities that are not punisha-
ble. These are perhaps the most controversial aspects of the law.
For example, section 4A(a)(2)(A) permits compliance with the
boycotting country's requirements concerning imports from the
boycotted country. 95 It also permits compliance with exporting re-
quirements of the boycotting country regarding exports to the boycot-
ted country. 96
Subsection (B) permits compliance with import and shipping
document requirements with respect to the origin of the goods in
question. 97 A year after enactment of these amendments, any informa-
tion given under this section may not be stated in negative terms. 98 For
the Arabs, this means that after June 22, 1978, they must be satisfied
with certifications that state "Made in the United States" instead of
ones that state "Not Made in Israel." 99
A distinction is made between requirements pursuant to a law of
the boycotting country, and requirements pursuant to a contract bet-
ween the American company and the boycotting country. In the
former, if the law requires that all shipments into the country must be
accompanied by a certificate showing that the goods did not originate
in the boycotted country, an American company may not comply after
June 22, 1978.100 But if the request is a part of a contract, the American
company may comply indefinitely because this "contractual re-
quirement... constitutes an import document requirement."' 0'1
Subsection (C) is one of the most controversial exceptions.l 0 2 It
allows Americans to comply with the unilateral selection of the boycot-
94 d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(5), Examples of "Controlled in Fact,"
example (viii) ).9
sPub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(2)(A) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).961d.
97Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(2)(B) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).
9 81d.
99S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 43.
10042 Fed. Reg. 48,568 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(4), Examples of
Compliance with Import and Shipping Document Requirements, example (iii)).
10 1 d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(4), Examples of Compliance with
Import and Shipping Document Requirements, example (iv)). Even if there is a law,
the boycotting country may still compel compliance by inserting the request into the
contract.
10 2See e.g., 123 CONG. REG. S7149-50 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke); id. at S7153 (remarks of Sen. Heinz); id. at S7155 (remarks of Sen. Javits); 123
CONG. REC. H3269 (daily ed. April 20, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Whalen); id. at H3272
(remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino); id. at 3277 (remarks of Rep. Wirth).
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ting country, in the "normal course of business," of the goods and
services for import into the boycotting country when such goods or
services are in the "normal course of business... identifiable by
source."1 03
The exception is available only if the selection is truly unilateral,
i.e., made by a resident or national of a boycotting country. 104 A
United States person may qualify as a bona fide resident of a boycot-
ting country.1
0 5
Goods identifiable by source in the normal course of business are
those labeled by a trademark, trade name, symbol or other identifica-
tion normally on the product, or those which may be identified by their
unique packaging or design. 106
All discretion for the selection must rest with the boycotting
country resident. Compliance is not permitted with selections stated in
negative terms. 10 7 Thus, a firm may not comply if the boycotter states
that it will take a component part from any company except those from
a certain list. However, an American firm can submit a list of potential
sub-contractors, including its recommendations, so long as its list and
recommendations are not boycott based. 10 8
If all the requirements are met, an American can comply with the
unilateral selection even if he knows it is boycott based. ' 0 9 However, a
later section of Title II, 4A(a)(3), states that compliance is not permitted
if made in contravention of the prohibitions against religious discrimi-
nation. 110 An American company would violate Title II if the Arab
importer with which it is dealing unilaterally selects firm A, a non-
Jewish firm, to supply the component parts, and the American com-
pany complies with the request when firm B, a Jewish firm, normally
supplies its component parts.'
10 3 Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title I, § 201 4A(a)(2)(C) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).
10442 Fed. Reg. 48,569 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d)(5) ).
0 5For a definition of "resident," see text accompanying notes 117-19 infra.
10642 Fed. Reg. 48,569 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d)(10) ).
1 07S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 43-44.
10 81f an American company did not include on a list any blacklisted firms,
theoretically a presumption of boycott based selections could arise. Much, of course,
depends on the facts of the particular case, such as whether qualified blacklisted firms
were excluded, whether unqualified non-blacklisted firms were included, and
whether qualified non-blacklisted firms were excluded. These are all factors which
could be considered in resolving this situation.
10942 Fed. Reg. 48,565 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d)(11) ).
11 0Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(3) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).111S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 47. The exact language of the report is as
follows: "For example, assume a U.S. seller, who would normally use components
made by X, receives an order from a boycotting country designating that the compo-
nents are to be supplied by Y instead because X is Jewish and dealings with Jews are
prohibited under that country's boycott policy. In that circumstance, the U.S. seller
could not comply." If the Arab nation states specifically that it wants Y's products
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With respect to services, the exception is available only when the
services are to be performed in the boycotting country. Thus if an
American tractor company receives an otherwise valid unilateral selec-
tion requesting that the tractors' engines be designed by a non-
blacklisted firm, the American company will not be permitted to
comply because "in the normal course of business, the services will not
be performed" in the boycotting country. 112
The Senate Committee report accompanying the Senate version of
Title II called this exception a "necessary, but limited, bow to real-
ity."
1 1 3
Subsection (E) permits compliance with passport and immigration
requirements of the boycotting country. 114 It thus allows Arab nations
to force American companies not to send Jewish people to work in
Arab lands.1" s The section is aimed at permitting an individual to
comply and does not allow American employers in the boycotting
country to submit lists of prospective employees when the lists are to
be used to screen individuals for boycott reasons. 11 6
because X is Jewish, then the American seller is and should be forbidden from
complying.
However, an Arab country may have legitimate business reasons for wanting
Y's product unrelated to Y's or X's religious affiliation. One can infer from the Senate
language that anytime a company chooses a non-Jewish firm pursuant to an Arab
request when the company usually deals with a Jewish firm, a presumption of
discrimination arises. Whether this was Congress' intent is unclear.
The original House bill, H5840, contained as part of the entire 4A(a)(2)(C)
exception the following: "except that this exception shall not apply in any case in
which the United States has actual knowledge that the sole purpose of the designation
is to implement the boycott." H5840, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977. The enacted law
does not contain this language, and one could draw a negative inference that scienter
of religious discrimination is not necessary. However, as mentioned earlier, this could
hardly have been Congress' intent since the intent to further the boycott is missing in
the absence of scienter.
11242 Fed. Reg. 48,569 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d)(8). 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.3(d), Examples of Permissible Compliance With a Unilateral Selection, Suppliers
of Services, example (v) ).
113S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 44. The Arab nations could still expect
compliance with their boycott, albeit in an indirect way, by making all their unilateral
selections boycott based. American companies will therefore, notwithstanding Title
II, feel the effects of the boycott.
1 14 Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(2)(E) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).
"15 Although not expressly stated, this inference seems to be a fair and logical one.
Limitations as to this effect are, however, set out. See note 116 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
116S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 45. "[T]his amendment is intended to
permit a U.S. firm to proceed with a project in a boycotting country even if certain of
its employees are denied entry for boycott reasons. However, this provision does not
mean that employees may be selected in advance in a manner designed to comply
with a boycott." But the amendment really does mean that "employees may be
selected in advance in a manner designed to comply with a boycott." An employer, in
choosing employees for work abroad, will not choose people who arepersona non grata
to the host country. If he knows that Jews will be denied visas by Saudi Arabia, for
example, it would be against business interests to include Jews on the list of prospec-
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Subsection (F) allows compliance by American residents of the
boycotting country with the local laws of that country. 117 It is applica-
ble only to bona fide residents of the country. To be classified as a bona
fide resident, the United States person must have legitimate business
reasons for being in the foreign country and must intend to maintain
the continuity of the residency.1 1 A United States person attempting
for legitimate business reasons to establish residency in a boycotting
country may furnish boycott related information pursuant to its quest
for residency. 119 At no time, however, may a United States resident in
the boycotting country discriminate against another United States
person on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin. 120
As the exception applies only to the United States person's ac-
tivities exclusively within his resident country, 12 1 it therefore does not
apply to imports of any kind, regardless of whether the United States
person is a bona fide resident. 122 But if the activity is exclusively within
the boycotting country, the exception is available to both individuals
buying for personal reasons and companies or banks buying for busi-
ness reasons.
123
There is an interesting and unusual aspect to this compliance with
local law exception. According to the Commerce Department regula-
tions, it will be "continually reviewed and carefully scrutinized" in
order to ensure compliance with the law while trying at the same time
to "avoid serious adverse economic.. . [as well as] political consequ-
ences for the United States... "124
tive employees. But this section prevents him from exck. ding them. To feign com-
pliance with the Act, then, the employer will add Jews to the list with the knowledge
that they will be rejected and that he will have to select others. This is one example of
where myopia to practical reality is manifested in Title II.
117Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(2)(F) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403-1a).
111842 Fed. Reg. 48,572 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(g)(4) ). This could
raise problems any time an American company opens a branch office in a boycotting
country, especially if it is not accompanied by some evidence of long-range intent.
"191d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(g), Examples of Permissible Compliance
With Local Law With Respect to Activities Exclusively Within a Foreign Country,
United States Person Resident in a Foreign Country, example (iv)).
12Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(g)(6) ).
21Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(g)(2) ).
22Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 36 9.3 (g), Examples of Permissible Compliance
With Local Law With Respect to Activities Exclusively Within a Foreign Country,
United States Person Resident in a Foreign Country, example (ii) ). Therefore if the
choice of sellers is boycott based, the American company violates Title II.
123S. REP. No. 95-104, supra note 28, at 45.
12442 Fed. Reg. 48,573-74 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(g)(8)).
Perhaps by negative implication this means that the other exceptions will not be so
continually reviewed or carefully scrutinized.
Congressional attitude toward this exception was belabored and cautious. See
123 CONG. REC. S7149-50 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke); id. at S7150
(remarks of Sen. Proxmire); id. at S7153 (remarks of Sen. Heinz).
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In an attempt to control noncompliance with the Act, Congress
included an evasion clause to Title II which stated that any person who
engages in an activity "with intent to evade the provisions of this Act"
shall be guilty of violation of Title 11. 125 Thus, if a corporation normally
does not include in its annual report a list of the countries in which it
does business, but puts in this information and gives the report to the
boycotting country, this action, absent some legitimate business
reason 126 is an evasion and hence a violation of Title 11. 127 Likewise, if a
company normally does not put an identification on its products but
does so pursuant to a unilateral selection by a boycotting country
resident, it violates Title 11.128
For contracts and other agreements entered into prior to May 16,
1977,129 a grace period is provided before Title II becomes effective. 130
The grace period expires December 31, 1978, but it may, at the discre-
tion of the Secretary of Commerce, be extended.1 31
Firms receiving boycott requests are required to report these to the
Secretary of Commerce and to indicate whether they intend to comply
with the request. 132
A company which violates Title II is subject to a fine, to have its
export license suspended or revoked, or it may have administrative
sanctions imposed against it. 133
125Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(a)(6) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a).
126The language of this passage creates a conflict between what could be a bona
fide business purpose and activity proscribed by the Act. For example, a corporation
could argue here that a legitimate business purpose for this action was the corpora-
tion's desire to get off the blacklist and increase trade with the boycotting country.
Logical as it may be, this argument contravenes both the spirit and letter of the law.
12742 Fed. Reg. 48,575 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4, example (i) ).
12 81d. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4, example (ii) ). It is unclear whether both
companies are in violation; clearly the one asking for the change is, but presumably
the receiver would be also if it had the requisite intent.
129This provision may work a hardship on those entering into contracts between
May 16 and June 22. The grace period does not apply to these contracts, and when
they were executed, it was not illegal to include boycott provisions. If such parties
cannot re-negotiate their now tainted contracts, they are confronted with a Hobson's
choice: (1) continue under the old contract but in violation of Title II, or (2) unilaterally
renounce their obligations under the old contract.
If the party renounces the contract, ordinary contract principles would not
afford the aggrieved party with a right to damages for the breach. Congress was either
not aware of, or chose to ignore, this problem. See 123 CONG. REC. H3295 (daily ed.
April 20, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Findley).
13°Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(b)(2) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a).
131Id. The Secretary of Commerce is given wide discretion in extending the grace
period.
13 2 Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 201 4A(b)(2) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a).
According to an undated Anti-Defamation League Memorandum Concerning
Constitutional Implications of Anti-Boycott Proposals (reprinted in Morgan Hearings, supra
note 25, at 718), an individual who complies with the request will be protected by the
5th Amendment against self-incrimination from reporting compliance, but a corpora-
tion has no such protection.
133Pub. L. No. 95-52, Title II, § 203(a) (to be codhied in 50 U.S.C. § 2407).
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Finally, Title II pre-empts any state statute which "pertains to...
compliance with... restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or
imposed by foreign countries against other countries." 134
Effects of Title II
Title II's effect on American trade with the Middle East and on
American foreign relations will turn largely on the response of the
Arab nations. It is safe to postulate that the Act is not likely to cause the
Arabs to abandon their boycott. 135 Despite the ambiguity which at-
tends any premonition in this field, certain aspects of the law can be
highlighted.
An American company receiving a boycott request will be forbid-
den by Title II from complying. 136 The Arab boycott rules state that any
company which refuses to comply with a request is subject to blacklist-
ing. 137 Therefore all Americans receiving boycott-tainted business of-
fers from Arab countries will be subject to blacklisting. The Arabs may
compromise their own principles by not including boycott requests in
offers to American companies, or by overlooking non-compliance. On
the other hand, they may, as a means of punishing American com-
panies, deal only with those whose products they could not buy in
comparable quality or price from another competitor and reject all
others. 138 Should this happen, American trade with Arab nations will
1341d. § 205 (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. § 2403-1a). Thus far, at least seven states -
New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, California, Ohio, Maryland and North Carolina -
have passed anti-boycott statutes. The Act pre-empts only those statutes aimed at
preventing compliance withu oreign boycotts; presumal statutes which deal solely
with discrimination are not pre-empted.
For a discussion of the constitutional factors involved in the New York statute
outside the Title II pre-emption, see Comment, The Arab Boycott and State Law: The New
York Anti-Boycott Statute, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 343 (1977). The author concluded that the
New York law would be declared unconstitutional.
135The arab boycott of Israel is grounded in the deep-rooted conflict in the Middle
East, and is not likely to end until there is an overall settlement. In Title II, according
to one Congressman who considered the House bill "peculiar," "[w]e are trying to
reduce or to harness a religious prejudice which has existed for almost 2000 years
between the Arab world and the Jewish world." 123 CONG. REC. H3281 (daily ed. April
20, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Ryan)..
136See text accompanying notes 45-77, supra.
13See text accompanying note 16, supra.
138Perhaps the single most crucial debate on the effects of the legislation centered
around the question of how much do the Arabs want American goods. There is no
doubt that American business has a lot to lose in Arab trade. United States trade with
Arab nations jumped from $1.1 billion in 1975, to $6.0 billion in 1976 and is expected to
reach $10 billion by 1980. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1977, Sec. D at 1, col. 4.
Jack Carlson, chief economist of the U. S. Department of Commerce predicted
that large multinational companies will suffer little from Title II, but that small
exporters, without the resources and expertise to comply with the law, will be hardest
hit. Id. at 7, col. 5.
Mohammed Magoub (see note 14), chief of the Arab League's boycott commis-
sion, said that American firms complying with the law will be denied trade with and
access to raw materials of the Arab boycotting nations. Id. at 7, col. 6.
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be virtually dictated unilaterally by the Arabs. Companies which offer
only an "average" product, but who have built up a business rapport
enabling them to capture a good portion of- the Arab market, may
suffer business setbacks as a result of Title II.
Title II will also penalize the firm which states in the boycott
questionnaire that it does not do business with Israel not because of
boycott pressure, but for legitimate business reasons. If the United
States loses business because of Title II, a negative impact on domestic
employment is imminent. 139
Congress in enacting Title II was not unaware of these possible
effects. 140 American compliance with the boycott presented overriding
moral issues, 141 and Congress took the position that "maintaining our
principles and the integrity of our conduct is worth the cost that will
ensue."
14 2
Title II's effects on American foreign relations with Middle Eastern
states presents issues beyond the scope of this note. 143 The Arabs may
take umbrage with it, and become more resistant to American peace
feelers. The Act may be perceived as a gratuitous affront to Arab
sympathies, making the United States less trustworthy. 144 Given the
Carter administration's expressed desire to follow an even-handed
policy in the Middle East, exemplified by a proposal that the Palesti-
nians be included in a peace conference, it is not absolutely clear that
Title II will anger the Arabs to any great extent. 145
The question remains: do the benefits to be gained from Title II
outweigh the potential problems it raises? It is true, as the Ford
administration argued, that action had been taken within preexisting
law to curb compliance with the most invidious aspects of the
boycott. 146 Yet principles of American democracy are concerned with
139How many jobs would be lost depends, of course, on the volume of business
that is lost. It is interesting that George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, and a man
who would naturally be concerned about any legislation that might entail loss of jobs,
supported the passage of Title II. 123 CONG. REc. H32681 (daily ed. April 20, 1977)
(remarks of Rep. Bingham).
14See Id. at H3268 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id. at H3274-5 (remarks of Rep.
Michel).
1411n his foreign policy debate with President Ford in October 1976, Mr. Carter
said that the boycott "is not a matter of diplomacy in trade with me. It's a matter of
morality." Id. at H3277.
1421d. at S7151 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Heinz).
'
4 3Representative Hamilton pointed out that Secretary of State Vance had said
that "carefully directed legislation and diplomatic action can protect our political and
economic interests in the Middle East." Id. at H3274 (daily ed. April 20, 1977).
144According to one Ford administration official, some Arab nations have become
"concerned at what they have seen as a deliberate attack or campaign against them."
Morgan Hearings, supra note 25, at 24 (remarks of Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State).
45The Ford administration's predictions about the negative effect of anti-boycott
law on American foreign policy may have been intended to thwart legislation. If the
Arabs react to Title II, it is more likely to be an economic response than a political one.
'46Testimony of William Simon, Morgan Hearings, supra note 25 at 42-3.
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something less than the most invidious. As a declaration of morality in
the international community, Title II was necessary. 147
Conclusion
Title II was devised to resolve a conflict between pursuit of morals
and of economic gain. It declares morals the victor. The true measure
of victory resides in the extent to which Title II is enforced. In an
attempt to compromise competing interests, the Act has left substantial
ambiguities.
147See text accompanying note 24 supra. It can be argued that under this section
the Secretary of Commerce was empowered to do everything to effectuate the same
purpose of Title II, but without the added possibility of antagonizing the Arab nations
with legislation. In § 3(5) of the EEA of 1969, 50 U.S.C. § 2402(5) (1977), Congress
declared that "it is the policy of the United States ... (B) to encourage and request
domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles ... to refuse to take any action,
including the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the
effect of furthering or supporting the... boycotts.., imposed by any foreign country
against another country friendly to the United States..." "Encourage and request"
does not mean the same thing as "prohibit," yet the policy reasons are the same. Had
a Secretary of Commerce by the authority vested in him by 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(1) -
allowing him to "exercise such controls ... as he determines are necessary to facilitate
and effectuate implementation of the policy set forth in this Act" - promulgated
regulations with the same effect as Title II has now, would that have been a
usurpation of power? Technically it would not, though the question is now moot.
This, however, would support the. argument that Title II is unnecessary and serves
only to put the United States in ai'embarrassing position.
Addendum
The Commerce Department has issued final regulations concern-
ing the scope and implementation of Title II.' In several areas the final
regulations differ significantly from the proposed version. The prop-
osed regulations stated that a foreign subsidiary of an American
company would be conclusively presumed controlled in fact if one of a
number of conditions were true. 2 The final regulations declare that no
presumptions are conclusive, that all are rebuttable by competent
evidence. 3 The final regulations also state that the presumption arises
if the American parent has the authority to appoint the chief operating
officer of the foreign subsidiary. 4
The proposed regulations stated that if any particular facet of a
transaction was within United States commerce, the entire transaction
was within United States commerce. 5 The final ones make an allo-
wance for a transaction of a foreign subsidiary when the American
parent furnishes only "ancillary services" to the subsidiary. For exam-
ple, if U.S. company A's corporate counsel provides legal advice to
company B, a controlled foreign subsidiary of A, concerning the
applicability of Title II to B's transactions, B's activities do not as a
result of this advice automatically come within the scope of U.S.
commerce, even though A's providing the advice is an action within
U.S. commerce. 6 Similarly, if A provided B with legal services in
connection with B's contract in a boycotting country, B's contract
'The Commerce Department in September 1977 issued proposed regulations and
invited comment on them. These final regulations take into account the comments and
criticisms of the proposed regulations.2See notes 90-91 of main Note and accompanying text.
343 Fed. Reg. 3513 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2) ). The Com-
merce Department made the changes in response to criticisms that "[clonclusive
presumptions leave no scope for the wide variety of factors which bear on the
question of control."
"Control in fact consists of the authority or ability to establish a subsidiary's of
affiliate's general policies or control its day-to-day operations [and] [i]t is possible...
to own well over 50% of a foreign subsidiary's voting securities and not possess
effective control [since] [clontrol in practice does not necessarily require ownership of
a particular proportion of a subsidiary's voting securities." Id. at 3508 (to be codified in
15 C.F.R. § 369 Discussion of Comments; "Controlled in fact").
41d. at 3513 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(vi) )."[This] power presumes
the authority or ability to control the subsidiary's.., day-to-day operations." Id. at
3508 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369 Discussion of Comments; "Controlled in fact")
'This issue was never discussed specifically in the main Note, but see note 86 and
accompanying text.
643 Fed. Reg. 3516 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1 Examples of Activities
in the Interstate or Foreign Commerce of the United States; Foreign Subsidiaries,
Affiliates and other Permanent Foreign Establishments of Domestic Concerns, exam-
ple (xi) ).
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would not come within U.S. commerce as a result of this advice, even
though A's provision of the advice is within U.S. commerce. 7
However, to come within this limited exception, the ancillary
services must be provided directly to the foreign subsidiary and may
not be part of the services ultimately provided to the subsidiary's
client. Thus, if company A in the above example guaranteed B's
performance of the contract B had with the boycotting country, B's
contract would be in U.S. commerce. 8 Likewise if A provided B with
engineering services in connection with B's contract. 9
The proposed regulations stated that action by a controlled foreign
subsidiary was in U.S. commerce if ordered or directed by the Ameri-
can parent.10 The final regulations state that even though the order
itself is in U.S. commerce, in and of itself it does not bring the
underlying activities of the foreign subsidiary within the ambit of U.S.
commerce. "
71d. (to be codified in Id., example (xiii)).
81d. (to be codified in Id., example (xiv)).
9 d. (to be codified in Id., example (xii) ). The difference between these last two
examples and the first two is that in the latter, A's services are not considered ancillary
because they are part of the services ultimately provided to the boycotting country.
The Commerce Department's rationale for this exception was that "[a] rule which
discourages the use of U.S.-source ancillary services would have little if any positive
anti-boycott effect. Indeed it could have adverse anti-boycott consequences by driving
U.S.-controlled foreign subsidiaries into the hands of foreign companies which have
little if any compunction about complying with foreign boycotts opposed by the
United States." Id. at 3409 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369 Discussions of Comments;
Activities in the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States, ancillary
services).
In a sense this exception defeats the spirit of Title II since it permits a controlled
foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company to engage in transactions which if considered
within U.S. commerce would be violations of Title II. The contrary rule, however,
might be an impermissible extension of the concept of U.S. commerce. See note 11 of
this addendum, infra.
10See note 79 of main Note and accompanying text.
1143 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.1(d)(2) ). "From the
point of view of U.S. anti-boycott policy, this distinction is immaterial [since] jurisdic-
tion over the person making the specific direction is sufficient to accomplish the
anti-boycott objectives of the statute. From the point of view of conformity with
permissible notions of U.S. commerce, this distinction is essential." Id. at 3509 (to be
codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369 Discussion of Comments; Activities in the interstate and
foreign commerce of the United States, Directions to a foreign subsidiary).
The final regulations do not specifically say that the underlying activities of a
foreign subsidiary are outside U.S. commerce when those activities are directed by the
American parent. See generally id. at 3514 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(1) to
(15) ) Only the Commerce Department's discussions of comments make that distinc-
tion. Id. at 3509 (t& be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369 Discussions of Comments; Activities
in the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States, Direction to a foreign
subsidiary) ("In and of themselves... [tihe activities of a U.S. parent corporation in
specifically directing prohibited boycott compliance by its controlled foreign sub-
sidiary... do not bring into U.S. commerce activities which are otherwise wholly
outside U.S. commerce.")
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With respect to the exception for unilateral selection, 12 the final
regulations state that any pre-selection services a United States person
might provide a boycotting country, such as submission of a list of
prospective sub-contractors, must be "of the type customarily pro-
vided in similar transactions by the firm (or industry of which the firm
is a part) as measured by practices in non-boycotting as well as
boycotting countries." 13
The final regulations impose an identical limitation on the provi-
sion of services that are to be performed in the boycotting country. 14
Services to be performed within the boycotting country are those
"customarily... performed by suppliers of those services within the
country of the recipient of those services.... ." An additional require-
ment is that a portion of the services to be performed in the boycotting
country must be a "necessary and not insignificant part of the total
services performed. ' 1 5
The final regulations limit the availability of the exception for
compliance with local law. The proposed regulations interpreted the
phrase "for his own use, including the performance of contractual
services" to include goods imported for turnkey and general retailing
operations. 1 6 The final ones restrict the definition of the phrase to
include only goods that are to be further manufactured or incorporated
or reprocessed into another product.1 7 That is, if the goods are to be
12See notes 102-13 of main Note and accompanying text.
1343 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.3(b)(6) ). "If such
services are not customarily provided in similar transactions, [they] may not be
provided without destroying the unilateral character of any subsequent selection." Id.
(to be codified in Id.) The proposed regulations contained no such limitation. See note
108 of main Note and accompanying text.
According to the Commerce Department, "[t]hese additional constraints are
imposed in the final regulations in order to ensure that pre-selection services are not
used as a device to facilitate boycott-based decisions by boycotting buyers." 43 Fed.
Reg. 3510 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369 Discussions of Comments; Unilateral
selection, Pre-selection services).
A strict reading of the final regulations leads to the conclusion that an American
company would violate Title II even if it provides a non-boycott related pre-selection
service to a boycotting country if that service is not "customarily provided in similar
transactions." However, the American company in this situation may not have the
requisite intent to a finding of a Title 1 violation. Nevertheless, the additional
limitation could have the effect of stifling innovations and initiative in the expansion
of services to customers.
14See note 112 of main Note and accompanying text.
1543 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.3(b)(14) ). "These
constraints will permit use of the exception for the selection of suppliers of services
which in good faith must be performed within the boycotting country while ensuring
that it is not used as a mechanism for unrestrained compliance with foreign boycotts
in the selection of suppliers of services." Id. at 3510 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369
Discussions of Comments; Unilateral selection, Services to be performed within the
boycotting country).
16See notes 117-24 of main wnote and accompanying text.
1743 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(6)(iv) ).
ANTI-BOYCOTr PROVISIONS
resold as are, or are for the purpose of filling an order from someone
else, they are excluded. 18 Also, the goods must be of a nature that are
customarily further manufactured, incorporated or reprocessed into
another product. 19
This exception is available only with respect to the importing of
goods. Specifically excluded is the importing of services. 20
The final regulations state, as did the proposed, that the exception
for compliance with local law will be "monitored and continually
reviewed to determine whether its continued availability is consistent
with the national interest." 21
The proposed regulations stated that a risk-of-loss provision in a
contract was not per se a prohibited refusal to do business. 22 The final
regulations state that if the risk-of-loss provision is an "artifice, device
or scheme... intended to place a person at a commercial disadvan-
tage.., because he is blacklisted or otherwise restricted for boycott
reasons from having a business relationship with or in a boycotting
country," the company demanding such a provision violates Title 11.23
Institution of risk-of-loss provisions after the effective date of the final
18d. (to be codified in Id., (f-2)(7) ). If, for example, an American company which
qualifies as a bona fide resident of a boycotting country has a contract to build an office
building in that country, it may import light fixtures, wallboard and office partitions
from non-blacklisted firms without violating Title II. Id. at 3534 (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. §369.3 (f-2) Examples of Permissible Compliance with Local Import Law,
Imports for U.S. Person's Own Use, example (vi) ). It may not, however, import
desks, chairs or typewriters from non-blacklisted firms without violating Title II. Id.
(to be codified in Id.) The difference is that the former are to be further incorporated
into another product.
19 d., at 3533 (to be codified in Id., (f-2)(7) ). "These limitations are intended to
ensure that this exception is not utilized for import transactions which are akin to
import for resale operations." Id. at 3511 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369 Discussions
of Comments; Compliance with Local Law, "For his own use, including the perfor-
mance of contractual services").20 d. at 3533 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.3(f-2)(8) ). "[Tihe language of the
statute is simply not susceptible of such a construction... to bring services within this
exception. Congress... could have.., made express reference to services.., under
this provision ... but did not [as it did] with the exceptions for unilateral selection and
compliance with import requirements." Id. at 3511 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369
Discussions of Comments; Compliance with Local Law, Importation of Services).
21 d. at 3533 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.3(f-2)(9) ). For discussion of this
language, see note 124 of the principal discussion and its accompanying text. The final
regulations say that the availability of this exception "may be limited or withdrawn as
appropriate." Id. (to be codified in id.). The Commerce Department is concerned with
the effect this exception might have on "economic and other relations of the United
States with boycotting countries." Id. (to be codified in id.).
"Congress intended this exception not as an avenue for general boycott com-
pliance but rather as a means to permit limited boycott compliance by U.S. persons
resident in a boycotting country." Id. at 3511 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369
Discussions of Comments; Compliance with Local Law, Scope of the Exception).22See generally notes 47-57 supra and accompanying text.
2343 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §369.4(c) ). This action is
considered an evasion of Title II.
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regulations is presumed to be an evasion and therefore a violation of
Title II.24 The presumption is rebuttable by a showing that the provi-
sion is in "customary usage without distinction between boycotting
and non-boycotting countries" and that there is a "legitimate non-
boycott reason" for using it.25
The old sections 369.1, 369.2 and 369.3 of Title 15 of the Code of
Federal Regulations are revoked and replaced by the new
369.1,369.2,369.3,369.4 and 369.5.
241d. (to be codified in Id., (d)).2
-1d. (to be codified in Id.)
